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Abstract—Molecular communication in nanonetworks is an 
emerging communication paradigm that uses molecules as 
information carriers. Achieving a secure information exchange is 
one of the practical challenges that need to be considered to 
address the potential of molecular communications in 
nanonetworks. In this article, we have introduced secure channel 
into molecular communications to prevent eavesdropping. First, 
we propose a Diffie–Hellman algorithm-based method by which 
communicating nanomachines can exchange a secret key through 
molecular signaling. Then, we use this secret key to perform 
ciphering. Also, we present both the algorithm for secret key 
exchange and the secured molecular communication system. The 
proposed secured system is found effective in terms of energy 
consumption. 
Keywords— Nanonetworks, molecular communications, 
security, secure channel, eavesdropping. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Molecular communication is promising to provide 
appropriate solutions for a wide range of applications including 
biomedical, industry, and environmental areas [1], [2]. Even, it 
can be integrated with the Internet of Things (IoT) to provide 
IoT-based healthcare services [3], [4] by implementing the 
concept of Internet of NanoThings [5]. This is an 
interdisciplinary research field and is significantly different 
from the electromagnetic (EM) communication system, since it 
utilizes molecules as carriers of information. However, 
molecular communication has a number of technical challenges 
to overcome. Introducing security into molecular 
communications is a fundamental challenge for researchers. 
There exist very few papers that focus on security aspects of this 
promising technology [6], [7]. These papers discuss several 
security and privacy issues and challenges in the context of 
molecular communications, in general. To the best of our 
knowledge, there exists no prominent work which attempts to 
mitigate any particular security risk. 
In this article, we deal with eavesdropping, a special class of 
threats, that might exploit vulnerabilities to breach security in 
molecular communications. It is the act of secretly listening to 
an ongoing communication between two nanomachines. In EM 
communications, a secure channel is established to prevent 
eavesdropping. To do this, two communicating parties follow 
Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol and generate a private 
key (a key only known to them). Then, information is encrypted 
using the key before transmission. However, in molecular 
communications, the main challenge is how to generate a private 
key so that the adversary cannot learn the exchanged key. 
Moreover, both key exchange process and encryption 
algorithms should be cost-effective in terms of computational 
complexity, and energy consumption. Authors in [8] make use 
of radio-frequency identification (RFID) noisy tags, similar to 
blocker tag suggested by authors in [9], to exchange secret key. 
These tags intentionally generate noise on the channel so that 
intruders in RFID communications can’t understand the key. 
The same idea has been tailored to security requirements in near 
field communication (NFC) [10]. However, these works have 
been performed in the context of EM communications. In this 
article, we try to establish a secure channel in molecular 
communications to defend against eavesdropping. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider that the underlying system is time-slotted with 
specific slot duration and the participating nanomachines are in 
a stationary fluidic medium at any distance within the network 
coverage. We also consider that these nanomachines are 
perfectly synchronized and communicate with each other using 
same types of messenger molecules. Symbols are supposed to 
be transmitted upon on-off keying (OOK) modulation through 
the memoryless channel. In this scheme, information bit 1 is 
conveyed by liberating an impulse of 𝑧1 number of molecules at 
the start of the slot, whereas no molecule is released for 
information 0. For the simplicity of presentation, we consider a 
full-duplex system; participating nanomachines can transmit 
and receive information at the same time. However, the 
proposed method, with a slight modification, can also equally be 
applied in a half-duplex system. 
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Fig. 1. Molecular communication with eavesdropping (A sends violet 
molecules, C-green molecules). 
In case of reception, a nanomachine counts the total number 
of messenger molecules received during the time slot. This 
received number of molecules, denoted by 𝑧2, is then compared 
to z, a threshold number of molecules. If 𝑧2 is less than z, the 
machine considers the received bit to be 0; otherwise, it decodes 
the received bit to be 1. We further assume that there exists at 
least a malicious nanomachine which uses a suitable detector to 
receive the transmitted molecules with the purpose of 
eavesdropping (see Fig. 1). 
III. EAVESDROPPING DISTANCE 
This is very noticeable that eavesdropping is a significant 
matter, since molecular communication is a wireless approach 
in practice. A question that may arise is how a malicious 
nanomachine can decode the transmitted data out of received 
molecules. This can be achieved by two ways. First, the intruder 
can do required experiments prior to an attack. Second, the 
attacker can have prerequisite knowledge from literature 
investigation. Also, it’s not unusual that the intruder will have 
the required detector to receive the molecules and the 
hardware/software arrangements to decode the received 
molecules, since this doesn’t need any special kit. 
Molecular communication is typically occurred between two 
nanomachines in near vicinity. A reasonable question is how 
close the malicious machine needs to be to be capable to detect 
the transmitted molecules. However, there is no exact answer to 
this question. The reason why we can’t answer this question 
accurately is that there is a number of factors which determine 
the said distance. For instance, the distance might be influenced 
by the following factors, among others: molecular 
characteristics of the given transmitting nanomachine, number 
of molecules sent by transmitting nanomachine, detector 
characteristics of the intruder, quality of the intruder’s 
nanomachine itself and location of the attack. Thus, any 
particular distance specified would only be usable for a definite 
set of the aforementioned parameters and cannot be utilized to 
develop common security strategies. Nevertheless, we can 
arguably say that eavesdropping can be performed up to a 
distance of more than a typical distance between two authentic 
nanomachines. In other words, a powerful attacker can still 
decode the information even when it operates from a relatively 
larger distance compared to intended receiving nanomachine.. 
IV. PROPOSED SECURE CHANNEL 
The idea is that both nanomachine A and nanomchine C 
transmit random data simultaneously. This is conceivable as 
nanomachines can launch and collect the molecules at the same 
time. In the setup phase, these two nanomachines synchronize 
on the exact timing of the bits and also on the energies (number 
of molecules) of the transmitted molecular signal. After the 
synchronization phase, machines A and C are able to send 
molecules at the same time with the same number of molecules. 
At the time of transmitting random bits of 0 (sending no 
molecules) or 1 (sending some predetermined number of 
molecules), both nanomachines also listen to molecular signal. 
Now, we consider all the possible cases below: 
Case 1: When both machines transmit a zero molecular 
signal, the sum of these two molecular signals is zero and a 
malicious nanomachine, who is eavesdropping, would recognize 
that both nanomachines sent a zero. This case does not help the 
malicious machine B to understand that which machine is 
sending a bit of the secret key. 
Case 2: When both machines transmit a one molecular 
signal, the sum of these two molecular signals is the double (two 
times the number of molecules set for sending a one) and the 
malicious nanomachine would recognize that both 
nanomachines sent a one. This case also does not help the 
malicious machine B to recognize that which machine is sending 
a bit of the secret key. 
Case 3: An interesting case is happened when nanomachine 
A sends a one whereas nanomachine C sends a zero or when 
machine A sends a zero whereas machine C sends a one. In this 
situation, both nanomachines can find what the other machine 
has transmitted, since both machines are aware of what 
information they themselves have just sent. Conversely, the 
malicious node B only understands the sum of two molecular 
signals and it cannot factually find out which machine sent the 
one and which machine sent the zero. 
This concept has been demonstrated in Fig. 2. While the top 
part of the figure shows the molecules released (violet color) by 
nanomachine A, whereas the middle part shows the molecules 
released (green color) by C. Machine A randomly transmits the 
eight bits: 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, and 1. Machine B randomly transmits 
the eight bits: 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, and 1. The bottom part of the 
figure displays the sum of the molecules released by both 
machines. This is the ultimate signal as observed by the 
malicious machine B. It clearly shows the resultant signal in case 
of A transmits 0, and C transmits 1 is the same as in the case of 
A transmits 1, and C transmits 0. Therefore, the malicious 
machine B can’t differentiate between these two cases. Then, the 
 
 
Fig. 2. The secret key exchange in molecular communication. 
two authentic machines now abandon all bits, where they 
transmitted the same number of molecules (corresponding to 
both A and C sent 0, and both A and C sent 1). However, both 
machines accept all bits, where they transmitted different 
number of molecules (corresponding to A sent 1 and C sent 0, 
and A sent 0 and C sent 1). They can consider either the bits 
transmitted by machine A or the bits transmitted by machine C 
as the secret key. This is basically a prior agreement as per 
security policies. In this fashion, both machines can exchange an 
encryption key of any desired length.  Thus, in this example, 
transmitted bits, by the selected nanomachine, at bit indexes 0, 
1, 2, and 4 constitutes the secret key, since the participatory 
machines sent different number of molecules at these bit 
indexes. Now, if a security scheme selects the nanomachine C 
for this purpose, the encryption key will be 0101. However, if 
the machine A is selected, the key is 1010. The key we have just 
obtained is 4-bits in length. Note that a secret key of any desired 
length can be achieved if both machines continue their 
operations until the target number of bits are stored. The 
flowchart in Fig. 3 shows the generalized algorithm of our 
proposed technique as described above. In this article, we will 
assume the desired key is 8 bits in length. 
The next step after the private key generation is to encrypt 
the information bit to be transmitted before it goes onto the 
channel through molecular modulation. For this purpose, we use 
Exclusive OR (XOR) cipher, since it is simple to implement and 
XOR operation is inexpensive in terms of computation. The 
encrypted bits are obtained by using the following logical 
operations, 
𝑥𝑗 = 𝑏𝑘𝑗 ⊕ 𝑏𝑖𝑗  for 𝑗 = 0,1, … ,7                          (1) 
where 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑏𝑘𝑗 and 𝑏𝑖𝑗 are the j-th bit of the encrypted bits to be 
modulated for molecular transmission, the secret key, and 
information block of 8 bits, respectively. There will be many 
applications of molecular communications where stringent 
security will not be required. In those cases, a simple hiding 
operation is sufficient enough to hide the information from 
unauthorized parties. This in turn ensures that frequent changes 
of private key are not mandatory. Conversely, security-sensitive 
applications will require relatively frequent changes of secret 
keys. In the receiving side, decryption operation, presented in 
(2), will be performed on the information bits after molecular 
demodulation by using the same logical operations as applied in 
(1). 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑏𝑘𝑗 ⊕ 𝑏𝑒𝑗 for 𝑗 = 0,1, … ,7                          (2) 
where 𝑦𝑗, 𝑏𝑘𝑗 and 𝑏𝑒𝑗 are the j-th bit of the decrypted bits, the 
secret key, and demodulated information block of 8-bit, 
respectively. If there occurs error free communication, 𝑦𝑗 
should be the same as 𝑏𝑖𝑗 . Our proposed secured molecular 
communication system thus eventually takes the form of Fig. 4. 
The serial-to-parallel (S/P) and parallel-to-serial (P/S) 
converters have been used, since the hardware XOR cipher 
performs 8-bit parallel XOR operations. However, this is a 
design issue. The same XOR cipher can alternatively be 
accomplished by using a single XOR gate. It is worth 
mentioning that the processing time to place secured molecular 
information onto the channel becomes negligible compared to 
the usual baseband information processing time, since there is 
no complicated computation in ciphering operations and 
parallel-to-serial and serial-to-parallel operations also occur 
instantly. Moreover, the use of hardware ciphering instead of 
software counterpart further reduces the associated time. Thus, 
our secured molecular communication system is effective in 
terms of information processing time. 
V. ENERGY CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS 
Let 𝐸𝑏
𝑇 and 𝐸𝑏
𝐶 be the energy required to transmit one bit of 
information, and energy required to compute one bit of 
information, respectively. Also, 𝑁 denotes the total number of 
information bits to be transmitted and the key length is 
designated by 𝐾. And the number of key generation to complete 
the information transmission is 𝑀. Since information bits (1’s or 
0’s) are randomly generated on an equiprobable basis and 
transmissions of two out of four possible cases (during key 
exchange) are discarded, participating nodes should exchange 
2𝑛 bits of information, on an average, to share 𝑛 bits of key. 
Therefore, the required energy to exchange the desired key once 
is 𝐸𝐾 = 2 × 𝐾 × 𝐸𝑏
𝑇 . Ciphering and deciphering 𝑁 information 
bits by using XOR logical operations require 𝐸𝐶 = 2 × 𝑁 × 𝐸𝑏
𝐶 
energy. Thus, the total energy required to transmit the 
information with security becomes 
𝐸𝑇
𝑆 = Energy for Information Transmission 
                                                        +𝑀 × 𝐸𝐾 + 𝐸𝐶  
= 𝑁 × 𝐸𝑏
𝑇 + 𝑀 × (2 × 𝐾 × 𝐸𝑏
𝑇) + 2 × 𝑁 × 𝐸𝑏
𝐶 .   (3) 
Considering the fact that the energy required to transmit one 
bit of information is analogous to the energy required to carry 
1000 logical operations [11], we use 𝐸𝑏
𝐶 = 0.001 × 𝐸𝑏
𝑇  in (3) 
and get 
𝐸𝑇
𝑆 = (1.002𝑁 + 2𝐾𝑀)𝐸𝑏
𝑇                         (4) 
In case of no security, the total energy required to transmit 
the information is Fig. 3. The algorithm for secret key exchange.  
𝐸𝑇
0 = Energy for Information Transmission = 𝑁 × 𝐸𝑏
𝑇   (5) 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To assess the proposed method, we perform computer 
simulation. We consider same types of molecules of the same 
size with OOK modulation scheme in a 2-dimensional confined 
space and 125 molecules/bit (𝐸𝑏
𝑇) is used on an average. The 
sizes of the messenger molecules are anticipated to be 
analogous to that of the fluid molecules. The threshold number 
of molecules is supposed to be 𝑧 = 20 . Transmitter and 
receiver are synchronized [12] so that the starting time of each 
molecular symbol at each communicating node becomes the 
same and the track of secret key sharing is maintained. The 4K 
information bits, divided into 4 frames, are transmitted. The 
frequent change of secret key is implemented by generating 
new keys after each 2 frames. 
The Fig. 5 presents the total energy requirements for 
secured molecular communication system under varying key 
length. It clearly shows that no additional energy is required to 
transmit secured molecular information in the proposed secure 
channel fashion. This is because the number of bits to send the 
same amount information remains unchanged. However, the 
secured molecular communication system needs energy in 
exchanging the secret keys and in processing the information 
for encryption. In case of simple information hide operation, 
where the key should be exchanged only once, prior to 
information transmission, the same key can relatively be used 
for a long time. As a result, the amount of additional energy is 
negligible compared to the total energy requirement for 
information transmission. Even, the amount of extra energy 
consumption is still very low for the cases where there might be 
a provision of frequent changes of shared keys (different key 
after a few frames), since the key is very short in length 
compared to the total length of several frames of interest. Thus, 
the proposed method is found energy efficient. Both simulated 
and analytical results are well matched at every case. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this article, we have proposed a secured molecular 
communication system to defend against eavesdropping. The 
participating nanomachines exchange a secret key through 
molecular signaling in such a way that adversary cannot 
understand the key. This key exchange mechanism doesn’t 
require significant additional energy. Also, the use of XOR 
ciphering to encrypt and decrypt the data using the generated 
secret key make the system simple and effective in terms of 
energy consumption. The proposed system can effectively be 
used in molecular communication systems where simple hide 
operations are sufficient or more stringent security are required. 
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Fig. 4. The molecular communication system with the secure channel. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of energy consumption. 
